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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS
MERIT ELECTRICAL & INSTRUMENTATION, a corporation, and
JONATHAN CARL JURETICH,
CHRISTOPHER M. SCHIFFMAN, DAN
A. JOHNSON, and KIT VANESS
Petitioners

vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
DIVISION of OCCUPATIONAL and
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING

Court of Appeals # 940435-CA

Respondent on appeal
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION
Respondents do not agree that this Court has any
jurisdiction to determine the merits of a nonfinal order
resulting from an informal proceeding.

See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-

3(2) (a) (Supp. 1993) or UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16 (1993).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 58-55-6 (2) (1990)

2.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 58-55-13(4)

3.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§

63-46b-4

4.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§

63-46b-15(l)

5.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63-46b-16

6.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2a-3

7.

Utah A d m i n i s t r a t i v e

( 1 9 9 3 Cum.

Supp.)

(1993)
(Supp.

1993)

Code § 1 5 6 - 4 6 b - 2 0 2

(1)

(n)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS
The petitioner, Merit Electrical and Instrumentation, Inc.
is not licensed as an electrical contractor in the State of Utah,
and its employees, Juretich, Schiffman, Johnson and Vaness are
not licensed electricians.

Kennecott Utah Copper, Inc. hired

petitioners to perform electrical work on a smelter building,
which is part of Kennecott's ongoing renovation project.
On December 9, 1993, the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing issued citations to Merit Electrical and
Instrumentation, Inc. and four of its employees for performing
electrical work without a license, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §
58-55-4 (1994) (now UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-55-301 (Supp. 1994) -1
Addendum A.

All five Petitioners contested the Citations. The

answers to the citations are compiled collectively in Addendum B.
The citations were issued pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-5513(4) (1993 Cum. Supp.) (now UTAH CODE ANN. 58-55-503(4) (1994)).
Contested citation hearings are classified as informal
adjudicative hearings by Utah Administrative Code R156-46b4(2) (d) (1994) (now R156-46b-202(1) (n)), in accordance with UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 63-46b-4(l), which authorizes the division to classify

proceedings by rule.

Jurisdiction over an action to judicially

review an informal administrative hearing is vested in the
district court by trial de novo, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 6346b-15(l).

Addendum C.

1

A record has not been compiled in this case; therefore,
there will be no references to a page in the record.
2

Because the citations were contested, an informal hearing
was scheduled.

However, prior to the hearing, on or about

February 11, 1994, the division moved to convert the proceedings
from an informal hearing to a formal hearing pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63-46b-4(3) (1990) . Addendum D.
An order converting the proceedings to a formal hearing was
issued by the informal hearing officer.

Addendum E. However,

when petitioners objected, the order was vacated on March 4,
1994.

Addendum F.

The parties filed briefs with the presiding

hearing officer of the informal proceeding, who issued a new
order on April 5, 1994, converting the proceedings to a formal
hearing.

Addendum G.

On May 5, 1994, petitioners filed a request for agency
review of the conversion order with the director of the
Department of Commerce.

The Executive Director of the Department

of Commerce issued an order on June 27, 1994, refusing to review
the conversion order on the grounds that she lacked jurisdiction
because the conversion order was not a final agency order.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 58-1-109(8) (1994).

further proceedings.

See

The matter was remanded for

Addendum H.

Petitioners then sought review of the non-final order with
this Court on July 27, 1994. On its own motion, the Court of
Appeals requested consideration of this case for summary
disposition based on Barney v. Division of Occ. & Prof. L i e . 828
P.2d 542 (Utah App.) cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).

3

The

Court denied summary disposition and requested that the
jurisdictional issues be briefed and argued to the Court.
ISSUE PRESENTED/STANDARD OF REVIEW
Does this Court have jurisdiction to review a nonfinal
agency order resulting from an informal adjudicative proceeding?
The jurisdictional issue has not been addressed or decided by any
lower tribunal; thus, there is no standard of appellate review.
However, whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law.
Blaine Hudson Printing v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 870 P.2d 291
(Utah App. 1994).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Employers like Kennecott benefit financially every day they
are permitted to use unlicensed and unregulated construction
workers like petitioners, in violation of Utah law.

Licensed and

regulated electricians cost more and are more demanding because
they are unionized.

This petition for review is a frivolous

attempt to use the appellate court to further delay a hearing on
the merits before the licensing agency.
This Court's jurisdiction is generally defined in UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-2a-3, but specifically limited in the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA")/ UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16.
Utah law does not give this Court jurisdiction to review an order
resulting from an informal agency adjudication.

Furthermore, as

this Court has clearly held, Utah law does not allow this Court
to review a nonfinal agency order.

4

Unlike the federal system,

this Court has no discretion to adopt a common law doctrine to
circumvent its statutorily defined jurisdictional parameters.
ARGUMENT
I.

THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISION ALLOWING
THIS COURT TO REVIEW A NONFINAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
RESULTING FROM AN INFORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDING.
A.

The Conversion Order Does Not Result from a Formal
Adjudicative Proceeding.

Absent a specific statute granting this court a right to
review this matter, this court cannot claim jurisdiction.

The

Court of Appeals is a statutory court whose jurisdiction "must be
provided by statute." DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd of Appeals 764
P.2d 627 (Utah App. 1988) . This Court has jurisdiction to review
agency action only when "the legislature expressly authorizes
review."

Jd. at 628.

Pursuant to the Constitution of the State

of Utah, all jurisdiction must be provided by statute.

Utah

Const, art. VIII, § 5.
The entire jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to review
administrative orders emanating from the Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing is set out in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a3(2) (Cum. Supp. 1994) and in UAPA at UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(l)
(1993).

Section 78-2a-3(2) defines the outer boundaries of this

Court's jurisdiction and states in pertinent part:

"The Court of

Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over: (a) The final orders and decrees
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies."
5

While Section 78-2a-3

generally grants this Court jurisdiction over interlocutory
appeals, it does not allow the Court of Appeals discretion to
review nonfinal, informal administrative orders.

This Court has

recognized that Section 78-2a-3 "defines the outermost limits of
our appellate jurisdiction, allowing us to review agency
decisions only when the legislature expressly authorizes a right
to review." DeBry, 764 P.2d at 627-8.

UAPA specifically limits

this Court's jurisdiction by allowing judicial review only of
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63-46b-16(l) (1993).

Both UAPA and Section 78-2a-3 require the agency order on
direct judicial review by this court to arise from a formal
agency action and to constitute final agency action.

There is no

basis for jurisdiction in this case, since the order converting
these proceedings to a formal hearing was issued by the presiding
officer assigned to hear contested citations, which are
classified as informal hearings.

UTAH CODE ANN.

Utah Admin. Code R156-46b-202 (1)(n).

§ 63-46b-4(l);

Thus, it resulted from an

informal adjudicative proceeding.
It is prerequisite to this Court's jurisdiction that the
contested order originate from a formal adjudicative proceeding.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly recognized the legislative
grant of jurisdiction to Utah's appellate courts only to review
actions in formal adjudicative proceedings.

Southern Utah

Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands, 830 P.2d 233, 234
(1992).

In that case, the jurisdictional linchpin was likewise
6

whether the agency action challenged arose from a formal or an
informal adjudicative proceeding.

The court reviewed the

language of both UAPA and its own jurisdictional statute, and
held:
These provisions make clear that this court has
jurisdiction over all dispositive orders arising from
formal adjudicative proceedings, while the district
courts have jurisdiction over final agency actions
resulting from informal proceedings.
83 0 P.2d at 236.

Since the matter arose from an informal

proceeding, the petition for review was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
Southern Utah Wilderness Assn. conclusively declares the
dispositive effect that both Section 78-2a-3 and 63-46b-16 have
in this case since no formal adjudicative hearing has been
scheduled and the only order which petitioners seek to challenge
in judicial review is the conversion order issued from the
informal hearing officer.

If since the agency order challenged

does not result from a formal adjudicative proceeding, this Court
has no jurisdiction.
B.

The Conversion Order Does Not Constitute Final Agency
Action.

Even if this order did result from a formal adjudicative
proceeding, this court would lack jurisdiction over the petition
for review.

The order converting the proceedings is not a final

order since this case has yet to be heard on its merits.

In

Barnev v. Division of Occ. & Prof. L i e , 828 P.2d 542 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992), petitioner claimed
to be subject to double jeopardy because action was taken against
7

him administratively and criminally.

Barney's motion to dismiss

the administrative charges was denied, and he petitioned for
judicial review of that order.

This Court concluded it had no

jurisdiction, holding that "UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(l) (1989)
grants this court jurisdiction to review final agency actions
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings."
(emphasis in original).

Id. at 544

The Court concluded such "finality"

exists when
the agency proceedings have been brought to their
conclusion by disposition of all issues before the
agency. The denial of a motion to dismiss allows the
proceeding to continue in agency and is not a final order
for purposes of judicial review.
Id. at 544. Thus, UAPA prohibits judicial review of all agency
action that has not culminated in a disposition of all issues
before the agency.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 63-46b-15(l) (a), and 16 (1) .

In this case, a formal hearing is still pending and the merits
have yet to be heard.
II.

UTAH LAW DOES NOT GRANT THIS COURT DISCRETION TO CREATE AN
EXCEPTION TO ITS STATUTORILY DEFINED JURISDICTION AND ADOPT
THE COMMON LAW FEDERAL COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE.
Petitioners concede the conversion order is interlocutory,

but argue that it should nonetheless be deemed "final" for
purposes of the judicial review provided for in sections 63-46b15 and -16, through application of the "collateral order
doctrine."

However, UAPA does not permit judicial review of any

type of nonfinal order resulting from an informal administrative
proceeding.

The statute leaves this Court with no discretion to

adopt a common law doctrine creating an exception to the plain
8

language restricting this Court's jurisdiction to review
administrative orders.

This Court cannot by case law reshape its

statutorily defined jurisdiction.
The collateral order doctrine was first enunciated Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949).

Cohen

was a derivative action brought in federal court by shareholder
plaintiffs.

The corporate defendant filed a motion to require

plaintiff to post security for reasonable expenses it incurred in
the action, in accordance with a state law requirement.

The

federal district court denied the motion, ruling that the state
law did not apply to the federal action.

The corporate defendant

appealed this order and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court.

.Id. at 543-45.

Addressing the appealability of the trial court's order as a
threshold matter, the Supreme Court concluded that it was an
appealable "final decision" within the federal statute fixing the
appellate jurisdiction of the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal,
28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545.

However, the Utah statute fixing this court's power to
review the orders of agencies governed by UAPA precludes this
Court from deeming an interlocutory order to be reviewable.

The

federal appellate courts have this power pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1291 and 1292 (1993), which give them jurisdiction over
appeals from "final decisions" of district courts, as well as
certain interlocutory court orders.

9

Therefore, the federal

statute defining federal appellate jurisdiction allowed appeals
from orders other than final trial court judgements.

See Cohen,

337 U.S. at 545.
The United States Supreme Court's ability to fashion an
interlocutory appeal was contingent on the specific language of
the federal appellate courts' jurisdictional mandate.

"It is

obvious that, if Congress had allowed appeals only from those
final judgments which terminate an action, this order would not
be appealable."

Id.

In contrast, UAPA limits this Court's

jurisdiction by authorizing judicial review only of "final agency
actions." Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-15(1) (a), -16(1) (1993) .2
This Court has specific and unambiguous jurisdictional limits and
is legislatively mandated to consider only petitions for review
of final orders or decrees from formal adjudicative proceedings.
There is no discretion vested in this Court to fashion a common
law exception to this statutorily defined jurisdiction.

As the

Utah Supreme Court has noted, "[i]n the absence of a specific
statute granting us jurisdiction over a writ of review from an

2

In the context of appellate jurisdiction of Utah courts to
consider appeals from trial courts, the only governing statute is
broad like the federal statute, permitting this Court to exercise
appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2) (Supp. 1994).
Thus, judicial adoption of the
"collateral order doctrine" to deem final an interlocutory trial
court order is not precluded in Utah.
Nonetheless, the Utah
Supreme Court has not yet found an appropriate situation meriting
use of the doctrine. See Tyler v. Department of Human Services,
874 P.2d 119 (Utah 1994).
10

agency proceeding, we have no jurisdiction." Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance, 830 P.2d at 234 (citing DeBrv, 764 P.2d at
628) .
CONCLUSION
Given the unalterable limits of this Court's jurisdiction,
Petitioners' request for review of the nonfinal, informal
administrative order is a frivolous attempt to delay a hearing on
the merits of the licensing issue as long as possible.

As this

Court stated in Barney, " [i]t is a court's first duty to
determine if it has jurisdiction.

If the court concludes that it

does not have jurisdiction, it retains only the authority to
dismiss the case." 828 P.2d at 544 (citing Varian-Eimac, Inc. v.
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989)).

Respondent

respectfully requests that the petition for review be promptly
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction so that the Division may
proceed with a formal adjudication on the merits.
Submitted this

I

day of February, 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney uene al

j=
ROBERT K
Assistant Attorney General

11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

(

day of February, 1995, I

caused to be mailed, first-class postage prepaid, two copies of
the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to:
James B. Lee (1919)
Barbara K. Polich (2620)
William J. Stilling (6339)
Attorneys for Petitioner
201 South Main Street
Suite 1880
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0898
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

58-55-4. License required — License classifications.
(1) (a) Any person engaged in the construction trades licensed under this
chapter, or as a contractor regulated under this chapter, shall become
licensed under this chapter before engaging in that trade or contracting
activity in this state unless specifically exempted from licensure under
Section 58-55-6.
(b) The license issued under this chapter and the business license issued by the local jurisdiction in which the licensee has its principal place
of business shall be the only licenses required for the licensee to engage in
a construction trade or as a contractor within the state.
(c) Neither the state nor any of its political subdivisions may require of
a licensee any additional business licenses, registrations, certifications,
contributions, donations, or anything else established for the purpose of
qualifying a licensed contractor to do business in that local jurisdiction,
except for contract prequalification procedures required by state agencies,
or the payment of any fee for the license, registration, or certification
established as a condition to do business in that local jurisdiction.
(2) The division shall issue licenses under this chapter to qualified persons
in the following classifications:
(a) general engineering contractor;
(b) general building contractor;
(c) residential and small commercial contractor;
(d) specialty contractor;
(e) journeyman plumber;
(f) apprentice plumber;
(g) residential journeyman plumber;
(h) residential apprentice plumber;
(i) master electrician;
(j) residential master electrician;
(k) journeyman electrician;
(1) residential journeyman electrician;
(m) residential trainee electrician; and
(n) apprentice electrician.
(3) An applicant may apply for a license in one or more classification or
specialty contractor subclassification. A license shall be granted in each classification or subclassification for which the applicant qualifies. A separate
application and fee must be submitted for each license classification or subclassification.
History: C. 1953, 58-55-4, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 128,ft 4; 1990, ch. 73, ft 3; 1992, ch.
303, 5 3; 1993, ch. 155, ft 2; 1993, ch. 297,
f 261.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, added "and" at
the end of Subsection (lKj), deleted former Subsection (IKk), relating to backflow device technicians, and redesignated former Subsection
(1K1) as present Subsection (IKk).
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, added Subsection (IKh), renumbering
former Subsections (IKh) through (IKk) as
Subsections (IKi) through (1)(1), and substi-

tuted "shall" for "will" in the second sentence
of Subsection (2).
The 1993 amendment by ch. 155, effective
May 3, 1993, inserted Subsections (lKg) and
(IKh), and made designation and stylistic
changes.
The 1993 amendment by ch. 297, effective
July 1, 1993, added Subsection (1), redesignated former Subsections (1) and (2) as Subsections (2) and (3), and substituted "residential
master electrician" for "master residential
electrician" in Subsection (2Kh).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

ADDENDUM B

me ft IT ,
ELECTRICAL & INSTRUMENTATION, INC

December 27, 1993

Utah Department of Commerce
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing
Construction Compliance Section
P. O. Box 45805
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Re:

Utah Department of Commerce
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing
Construction Compliance Section Citations

Gentlemen:
Enclosed please find the responses of MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc., Jonathan
Carl Juretich, Christopher M. Schiffman, Dan A. Johnson and Kit Vaness Carson to the following
citations:
L

MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc., Citation Number 1986;

2.

Jonathan Carl Juretich, Citation Number 1841;

3.

Christopher M. Schiffman, Citation Number 1917;

4.

Dan A Johnson, Citation Number 1918;

5.

Kit Vaness Carson, Citation Number 1842.

As indicated in each "Notice of Response" MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc. and
each of the individual employees deny committing the offense described in the citation and we
request a hearing to contest the citations. MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc., and the
individual employees contest the citations because we are exempt from licensure. Section 58-556(2) Utah Code AnnoL, 1990 exempts from licensure ". . . any person engaged in . . .
construction and repair relating t o . . . metal and coal mining.... All of MERIT Electrical &
Instrumentation, Inc.'s work for which it and the individual employees were cited involves
construction relating to metal mining.

Utah Department of Commerce
December 27, 1993
Page 2

Please advise MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation , Inc., and the individual employees
of the date, time and place of the citation hearing at their addresses listed in each Notice of
Response. Please provide notice to MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc., of the citation
hearing concerning it and the individual employees at the following additional addresses:
1.

MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc.
Attn: Dave Roberts
Richard Cloy
17723 Airline Highway
Prairieville, Louisiana 70769

2.

MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc.
Attn: Clint Cloy
12000 W. 2100 South
P. O. Box 266
Magna, Utah 84044

Please also advise our attorney Armin J. Moeller, Jr., of the citation hearing for MERIT
Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc., and the individual employees at his address:
Annin J. Moeller, Jr., Esquire
Phelps Dunbar
P. O. Box 23066
Jackson, Mississippi 39225-3066
Should you have any questions concerning these matters, please contact me at (504) 6738850.
cerely,

»ave Roberts
President
DR/tm

160

NOTICE OF RESPONSE
.parfcment of Commerce
.vision of Occupational & Professional Licensing
>nstruction Compliance Section
0. Box 45805
>0 East 300 South
Lit Lake City, Utah 84145

JITATION #

D/ *f & C

DATE OF CITATION:

IAME: /ft&LtT t^u^rr^(A^jf.
ADDRESS: /AOCCS

CKJ£5S>T

-~--^^__^- -y
*i***i£J&r

-£*<-.

PHONE NUMBER:

/2~-?-

2df-

T^

3.S7--cnts

2-yoQ ,5>~OOT-rt

fHE CITATION ISSUED TO YOU MAY BE CONTESTED BY NOTIFYING THE DIVISION IN
FRXTING WITHIN 20 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE SERVICE OF THE CITATION THAT YOU
flSH TO CONTEST THE CITATION AT A HEARING CONDUCTED UNDER TITLE 63,
ZHAPTER 46b, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT. A CITATION WHICH IS NOT
SONTESTED BECOMES THE FINAL ORDER OF THE DIVISION AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO
FURTHER REVIEW. ANY PERSON WHO FAILS TO COMPLY WITH A CITATION AFTER IT
JECOMES THE FINAL ORDER OF THE DIVISION IS GUILTY OF A CLASS A
USDEMEANOR AND THE DIVISION MAY REFUSE TO ISSUE OR RENEW OR MAY
SUSPEND, REVOKE, OR PLACE ON PROBATION A LICENSE YOU HOLD OR APPLY FOR.
»LEASE SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES IN RESPONDING
X) THE CITATION ISSUED TO YOU:
___

1. I ADMIT COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION,
CHOOSE NOT TO CONTEST THE CITATION AND TO COMPLY WITH ITS
SANCTIONS, AND HEREBY SUBMIT THE FINE SHOWN ON THE DOPL
CITATION FINE SCHEDULE ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THE CITATION.
2. I ADMIT COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION
BUT REQUEST A HEARING TO EXPLAIN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
OFFENSE.

X

3. I DENY COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION
AND REQUEST A HEARING TO CONTEST THE CITATION.

C CERTIFY THAT I HAVE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE THE ABOVE ELECTION
)F RIGHTS. I UNDERSTAND THAT IF I REQUEST A HEARING, THE DIVISION WILL
IOTIFY ME IN WRITING OF THE HEARING DATE AND THAT IF I FAIL TO APPEAR AT
?HE HEARING, A DEFAULT JUDGEMENT WILL BE ENTERED AGAINST ME.
[ FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT THE ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY THE PRESIDING
>FFICER AT A HEARING ARE FIRST, WHETHER THE CITED OFFENSE IS SUPPORTED
IY COMPETENT EVIDENCE; SECOND, WHETHER THE CITATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ISSUED; AND IF SO, THIRD, WHETHER THE SANCTION IMPOSED BY THE CITATION
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, REJECTED OR MODIFIED (DECREASED, INCREASED,
SUSPENDED, REMITTED;, OR VACATED) .
SIGNATURE:

NOTICE OF RESPONSE
^ n t of Commerce
j.on of Occupational & Professional Licensing
struction Compliance Section
J. Box 4 5805
0 East 300 South
It Lake City, Utah 84145

STATION # Q[CJl&
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A. . ^ H > N 5 ^
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.'HE CITATION ISSUED TO YOU MAY BE CONTESTED BY NOTIFYING THE DIVISION IN
IRXTING WITHIN 20 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE SERVICE OF THE CITATION THAT YOU
riSH TO CONTEST THE CITATION AT A HEARING CONDUCTED UNDER TITLE 63,
JHAPTER 46b, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT. A CITATION WHICH IS NOT
CONTESTED BECOMES THE FINAL ORDER OF THE DIVISION AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO
FURTHER REVIEW. ANY PERSON WHO FAILS TO COMPLY WITH A CITATION AFTER IT
3ECOMES THE FINAL ORDER OF THE DIVISION IS GUILTY OF A CLASS A
MISDEMEANOR AND THE DIVISION MAY REFUSE TO ISSUE OR RENEW OR MAY
SUSPEND, REVOKE, OR PLACE ON PROBATION A LICENSE YOU HOLD OR APPLY FOR.
"LEASE SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES IN RESPONDING
•O THE CITATION ISSUED TO YOU:
__

1. I ADMIT COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION,
CHOOSE NOT TO CONTEST THE CITATION AND TO COMPLY WITH ITS
SANCTIONS, AND HEREBY SUBMIT THE FINE SHOWN ON THE DOPL
CITATION FINE SCHEDULE ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THE CITATION.

_

2. I ADMIT COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION
BUT REQUEST A HEARING TO EXPLAIN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
OFFENSE.
>C

3. I DENY COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION
AND REQUEST A HEARING TO CONTEST THE CITATION.

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE THE ABOVE ELECTION
OF RIGHTS. I UNDERSTAND THAT IF I REQUEST A HEARING, THE DIVISION WILL
NOTIFY ME IN WRITING OF THE HEARING DATE AND THAT IF I FAIL TO APPEAR AT
THE HEARING, A DEFAULT JUDGEMENT WILL BE ENTERED AGAINST ME.
I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT THE ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY THE PRESIDING
OFFICER AT A HEARING ARE FIRST, WHETHER THE CITED OFFENSE IS SUPPORTED
BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE; SECOND, WHETHER THE CITATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ISSUED; AND IF SO, THIRD, WHETHER THE SANCTION IMPOSED BY THE CITATION
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, REJECTED; OR MODIFIED (DECREASED, INCREASED,
SUSPENDED, REMITTED
SIGNATURE

ATE:
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NOTICE OF RESPONSE
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THE CITATION ISSUED TO YOU MAY BE CONTESTED BY NOTIFYING THE DIVISION IN
WRITING WITHIN 20 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE SERVICE OF THE CITATION THAT YOU
WISH TO CONTEST THE CITATION AT A HEARING CONDUCTED UNDER TITLE 63,
CHAPTER 46b, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT. A CITATION WHICH IS NOT
CONTESTED BECOMES THE FINAL ORDER OF THE DIVISION AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO
FURTHER REVIEW. ANY PERSON WHO FAILS TO COMPLY WITH A CITATION AFTER IT
BECOMES THE FINAL ORDER OF THE DIVISION IS GUILTY OF A CLASS A
MISDEMEANOR AND THE DIVISION MAY REFUSE TO ISSUE OR RENEW OR MAY
SUSPEND, REVOKE, OR PLACE ON PROBATION A LICENSE YOU HOLD OR APPLY FOR.
PLEASE SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES IN RESPONDING
TO THE CITATION ISSUED TO YOU:
__

1. I ADMIT COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION,
CHOOSE NOT TO CONTEST THE CITATION AND TO COMPLY WITH ITS
SANCTIONS, AND HEREBY SUBMIT THE FINE SHOWN ON THE DOPL
CITATION FINE SCHEDULE ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THE CITATION.

__

2. I ADMIT COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION
BUT REQUEST A HEARING TO EXPLAIN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
OFFENSE.

X

3. I DENY COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION
AND REQUEST A HEARING TO CONTEST THE CITATION.

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE THE ABOVE ELECTION
OF RIGHTS. I UNDERSTAND THAT IF I REQUEST A HEARING, THE DIVISION WILL
NOTIFY ME IN WRITING OF THE HEARING DATE AND THAT IF I FAIL TO APPEAR AT
THE HEARING, A DEFAULT JUDGEMENT WILL BE ENTERED AGAINST ME.
I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT THE ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY THE PRESIDING
OFFICER AT A HEARING ARE FIRST, WHETHER THE CITED OFFENSE IS SUPPORTED
BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE; SECOND, WHETHER THE CITATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ISSUED; AND IF SO, THIRD, WHETHER THE SANCTION IMPOSED BY THE CITATION
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, REJECTED OR MODIFIED (DECREASED, INCREASED,
SUSPENDED, REMITTED,,-pR YApATED)
SIGNATURE:

J &

DATE:

/Z.-Zrf-f'S

m

NOTICE OF RESPONSE
0° a t i o n a l & P r o f e s s i o n a l
*g££liance Section
^

Licensing

~|o s o u t h
XitY,
U t a h 8414 5

3

' J x I A T l O N # & / f?/
DATE OF CITATION:
/ 3 *" / ' & y
uaME:
7
b
AJG~-f-^ceo
£VK./
^/
u
r
e
i
i
c
1^
PHONE
NUMBER;
fOi- A5"2-Q->^r~
t
ADDRESS t
/^OQQ
c^tf>r
^<oo
3&Q77"
/1-V+tS AJ*» / U7VA H
f4*04.4-

THE CITATION ISSUED TO YOU MAY BE CONTESTED BY NOTIFYING THE DIVISION IN
WRITING WITHIN 20 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE SERVICE OF THE CITATION THAT YOU
WISH TO CONTEST THE CITATION AT A HEARING CONDUCTED UNDER TITLE 63,
CHAPTER 46b, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT. A CITATION WHICH IS NOT
CONTESTED BECOMES THE FINAL ORDER OF THE DIVISION AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO
FURTHER REVIEW. ANY PERSON WHO FAILS TO COMPLY WITH A CITATION AFTER IT
BECOMES THE FINAL ORDER OF THE DIVISION IS GUILTY OF A CLASS A
MISDEMEANOR AND THE .DIVISION MAY REFUSE TO ISSUE OR RENEW OR MAY
SUSPEND, REVOKE, OR PLACE ON PROBATION A LICENSE YOU HOLD OR APPLY FOR.
PLEASE SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES IN RESPONDING
TO THE CITATION ISSUED TO YOU;
_

1. I ADMIT COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION,
CHOOSE NOT TO CONTEST THE CITATION AND TO COMPLY WITH ITS
SANCTIONS, AND HEREBY SUBMIT THE FINE SHOWN ON THE DOPL
CITATION FINE SCHEDULE ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THE CITATION.
2. I ADMIT COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION
BUT REQUEST A HEARING TO EXPLAIN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
OFFENSE.
X

3. I DENY COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION
AND REQUEST A HEARING TO CONTEST THE CITATION.

CERTIFY THAT I HAVE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE THE ABOVE ELECTION
>F RIGHTS. I UNDERSTAND THAT IF I REQUEST A HEARING, THE DIVISION WILL
rOTIFY ME IN WRITING OF THE HEARING DATE AND THAT IF I FAIL TO APPEAR AT
•HE HEARING, A DEFAULT JUDGEMENT WILL BE ENTERED AGAINST ME.
FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT THE ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY THE PRESIDING
FFICER AT A HEARING ARE FIRST, WHETHER THE CITED OFFENSE IS SUPPORTED
Y COMPETENT EVIDENCE; SECOND, WHETHER THE CITATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN
6SUED; AND IF SO, THIRD, WHETHER THE SANCTION IMPOSED BY THE CITATION
HOULD BE AFFIRMED, REJECTED OR MODIFIED (DECREASED, INCREASED,
USPENDED, REMITTED, OR VACATED).
IGNATURE:

M \Lfij\L%/Jt\.

DATE:
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NOTICE OF RESPONSE
,c of Commerce
/i of Occupational & Professional Licensing
,-uction Compliance Section
Box 45805
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,alt Lake City, Utah 8414 5

CITATION # 0/
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THE CITATION ISSUED TO YOU MAY BE CONTESTED BY NOTIFYING THE DIVISION IN
WRITING WITHIN 20 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE SERVICE OF THE CITATION THAT YOU
WISH TO CONTEST THE CITATION AT A HEARING CONDUCTED UNDER TITLE 63,
CHAPTER 46b, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT. A CITATION WHICH IS NOT
CONTESTED BECOMES THE FINAL ORDER OF THE DIVISION AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO
FURTHER REVIEW. ANY PERSON WHO FAILS TO COMPLY WITH A CITATION AFTER IT
BECOMES THE FINAL ORDER OF THE DIVISION IS GUILTY OF A CLASS A
MISDEMEANOR AND THE DIVISION MAY REFUSE TO ISSUE OR RENEW OR MAY
SUSPEND, REVOKE, OR PLACE ON PROBATION A LICENSE YOU HOLD OR APPLY FOR.
PLEASE SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES IN RESPONDING
TO THE CITATION ISSUED TO YOU:
m__

1. I ADMIT COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION,
CHOOSE NOT TO CONTEST THE CITATION AND TO COMPLY WITH ITS
SANCTIONS, AND HEREBY SUBMIT THE FINE SHOWN ON THE DOPL
CITATION FINE SCHEDULE ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THE CITATION.
2. I ADMIT COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION
BUT REQUEST A HEARING TO EXPLAIN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
OFFENSE.

X

3. I DENY COMMITTING THE OFFENSE DESCRIBED IN THE CITATION
AND REQUEST A HEARING TO CONTEST THE CITATION.

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE THE ABOVE ELECTION
OF RIGHTS. I UNDERSTAND THAT IF I REQUEST A HEARING, THE DIVISION WILL
NOTIFY ME IN WRITING OF THE HEARING DATE AND THAT IF I FAIL TO APPEAR AT
THE HEARING, A DEFAULT JUDGEMENT WILL BE ENTERED AGAINST ME.
I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT THE ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY THE PRESIDING
OFFICER AT A HEARING ARE FIRST, WHETHER THE CITED OFFENSE IS SUPPORTED
BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE; SECOND, WHETHER THE CITATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN
ISSUED; AND IF SO, THIRD, WHETHER THE SANCTION IMPOSED BY THE CITATION
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, REJECTED OR MODIFIED (DECREASED, INCREASED,
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ADDENDUM C

58-55-13. Penalty for unlawful conduct — Citations.
(1) Any person who violates Subsections 58-55-2(32)(a) through (n), (p), or
(q), or who fails to comply with a citation issued under this section after it is
final, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Any person who violates the provisions of Subsection 58-55-2(32)(h) or (m) may not be awarded and may not
accept a contract for the performance of the work. Any licensee who submits a
notice of intent to request an increase in the monetary limit under Subsection
58-55-21(5), but who is not granted an increase sufficient to cover the award of
a contract upon which he has bid, may not be awarded and may not accept the
contract.
(2) Any person who violates the provisions of Subsection 58-55-2(32)(o) is
guilty of an infraction unless the violator did so with the intent to deprive the
person to whom money is to be paid of the money received, in which case the
violator is guilty of theft, as classified in Section 76-6-412.
(3) Grounds for immediate suspension of the licensee's license by the division and the board include the failure by a licensee to make application to,
report to, or notify the division with respect to any matter for which application, notification, or reporting is required under this chapter or rules adopted

under this chapter, including applying to the division for a new license to
engage in a new specialty classification or to do business under a new form of
organization or business structure, filing with the division current financial
statements, notifying the division concerning loss of insurance coverage, or
change in qualifier.
(4) (a) If upon inspection or investigation, the division concludes that a
contractor has violated the provisions of Subsections 58-55-2(32)(a), (b),
(c), or any rule or order issued with respect to these subsections, and that
disciplinary action is appropriate, the director or his designee from within
the division for each alternative respectively, shall, promptly issue a citation to the contractor according to this chapter and any pertinent rules,
attempt to negotiate a stipulated settlement, or notify the contractor to
appear before an adjudicative proceeding conducted under Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
(i) Any person who is in violation of the provisions of Subsection
58-55-2(32)(a), (b), or (c), as evidenced by an uncontested citation, a
stipulated settlement, or by afindingof violation in an adjudicative
proceeding, may be assessed a fine pursuant to Subsection (4)(i) and
may, in addition to or in lieu of, be ordered to cease and desist from
violating Subsection 58-55-2(32)(a), (b), or (c).
(ii) Except for a cease and desist order, the licensure sanctions
cited in Section 58-55-12 may not be assessed through a citation.
(b) Each citation shall be in writing and describe with particularity the
nature of the violation, including a reference to the provision of the chapter, rule, or order alleged to have been violated. The citation shall clearly
state that the recipient must notify the division in writing within 20
calendar days of service of the citation if the recipient wishes to contest
the citation at a hearing conducted under Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. The citation shall clearly explain the consequences of failure to timely contest the citation or to make payment of
any fines assessed by the citation within the time specified in the citation.
(c) The division may, in its discretion, issue a notice in lieu of a citation.
(d) Each citation issued under this section, or a copy of each citation,
may be served upon any person upon whom a summons may be served in
accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and may be made
personally or upon his agent by a division investigator or by any person
specially designated by the director or by mail.
(e) If within 20 calendar days from the service of a citation, the person
to whom the citation was issued fails to request a hearing to contest the
citation, the citation becomes the final order of the division and may not
be subject to further agency review. The period to contest a citation may
be extended by the division for cause.
(D The division may refuse to issue or renew, suspend, revoke, or place
on probation the license of a licensee who fails to comply with a citation
after it becomes final.
(g) The failure of an applicant for licensure to comply with a citation
after it becomes final is a ground for denial of license.
(h) No citation may be issued under this section after the expiration of
six months following the occurrence of any violation.

(i) Fines shall be assessed by the director or his designee according to
the following:
(i) for a first offense handled pursuant to Subsection (4)(a), a fine of
up to $1,000;
(ii) for a second offense handled pursuant to Subsection (4Xa), a
fine of up to $2,000; and
(iii) for any subsequent offense handled pursuant to Subsection
(4Ha),a fine of up to $2,000 for each day of continued offense.
(5) Any penalty imposed by the director under Subsection (4Ki) shall be
deposited into the Commerce Service Fund. Any penalty which is not paid
may be collected by the director by either referring the matter to a collection
agency or bringing an action in the district court of the county in which the
person against whom the penalty is imposed resides or in the county where
the office of the director is located. Any county attorney or the attorney general of the state is to provide legal assistance and advice to the director in any
action to collect the penalty. In any action brought to enforce the provisions of
this section, reasonable attorney's fees and costs shall be awarded.
History: C. 1053, 58-55-13, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 297, I 266; 1993, ch. 9, I 7.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1992,
ch 303, 5 10 repealed former I 58-55-13, as
enacted by L. 1989, ch. 128, § 13, defining unprofessional conduct, and enacted former
§ 58-55-13, effective April 27, 1992.
Laws 1993, ch 297, I 266 repeals former
ft 58-55-13, as enacted by Lews 1992, ch. 303,
including examples in the definition of "unpro-

fessional conduct," and enacts the present section, effective July 1, 1993.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment by ch. 9, amending this section a/ repealed and reenacted by ch. 297, rewrote Subsection (1) and substituted w58-55-2C29Ko)M for
M
66-55-2(29Xnr (now 58-55-2(32Ko); see
I 58-55-2 and its notes) in Subsection (2).

R15646b. Utah Administrative Procedures Act Rules.
Rl5646b-1.
R156-46b-2.
R156-46&-3.
R156-46b-4.
ceedings.

Purpose.
Definitions.
General Provisions.
Formal and Informal Adjudicative Pro-

H156-46b-l. Purpose.
The purpose of these rules is to clarify the procedures for adjudicative proceedings before the Division
of Occupational and Professional Licensing and to
designate those categories of adjudicative proceedings
within the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing which will be conducted on a formal or informal basis, in accordance with Title 63, Chapter
46b, Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Title 58,
Chapter 1, Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing, and the Rules of Procedure for Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce.
R15646b-2. Definitions.
The definitions set forth in Sections 68-1-2 and
63-46b-2 and R151-46b-2 are incorporated by reference and shall apply to these rules.
Rl56-46b~3. General Provisions.
The general provisions set forth in R151-46b-3 are
incorporated by reference and shall apply to these
rules.
Rl56-46b-4. Formal and Informal Adjudicative
Proceedings.
(1) Any adjudicative proceedings as to the following
matters shall be conducted on a formal basis:
(a) A request for agency action and any proceedings
thereafter conducted before a special appeals board
subsequent to the denial of an application for an initial license, certificate, registration, permit or other
authority to engage in a profession or occupation. A
request for such agency action shall be filed within 30
days after the issuance of the denial of the application
for licensure, certification, registration, permit or
other authority to engage in a profession or occupation.
(b) The refusal to renew any license, certificate,
registration, permit or other authority to engage in a
profession or occupation.
(c) An action which may result in the revocation,
suspension or probation of any license, certificate,
registration, permit or other authority to engage in a
profession or occupation.
(d) The issuance of a cease and desist order except
m conjunction with a citation issued under Title 58,
Chapter 55, Construction Trades Licensing Act.

(e) The issuance of a fine except in conjunction with
a citation issued under Title 58, Chapter 55, Construction Trades Licensing Act.
(f) Any proceedings conducted subsequent to the
immediate suspension of a controlled substance license.
(2) Any adjudicative proceedings as to the following
matters shall be conducted on an informal basis:
(a) The application for, and issuance or denial of, an
initial license, certificate, registration, permit or
other authority to engage in a profession or occupation, including any application by a person whose license, certificate, registration, permit or other authority to engage in a profession or occupation was
revoked.
(b) The application for, and issuance of, a renewal
of an active or inactive license, certificate, registration, permit or other authority to engage in a profession or occupation.
(c) The issuance of a public or private reprimand.
(d) Any hearing held in conjunction with a citation
issued under Title 58, Chapter 55, Construction
Trades Licensing Act.
(e) Any independent proceedings to subsequently
modify the terms of suspension or probation set forth
in a previously entered order.
(f) The eligibility of a licensee for placement or continued participation in a diversion program.
(3) Pursuant to Subsection 63-46b-l(2)(f), a citation
issued under Title 58, Chapter 55, Construction
Trades Licensing Act, is not an adjudicative proceeding governed by Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, unless the citation is contested.
(4) All adjudicative proceedings as to any matters
not specifically listed herein shall be conducted on an
informal basis.
(5) Hearings are not required for informal proceedings unless required by statute or rule, or permitted
by rule and requested by a party within the time
prescribed by rule. Unless otherwise provided, a request for a hearing permitted by rule must be submitted in writing no later than 20 days following the
issuance of the notice of agency action if the proceeding was initiated by the division, or together with the
request for agency action if the proceeding was not
initiated by the division.
(6) Any final order issued by the division is subject
to agency review consistent with the provisions of
Section 63-46b-12 and the Rules of Procedure which
govern Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce.
1W2
58.1-6(1), 63-46b-l(5)

63-46b-4. Designation of adjudicative proceedings as formal or informal.
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories of adjudicative proceedings to be conducted informally according to the procedures set forth in rules
enacted under the authority of this chapter if:
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not violate any procedural
requirement imposed by a statute other than this chapter;
(b) in the view of the agency, the rights of the parties to the proceedings will be reasonably protected by the informal procedures;
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency'6 administrative efficiency will
be enhanced by categorizations; and
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceedings outweighs the potential
benefits to the public of a formal adjudicative proceeding.
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), all agency adjudicative proceedings not specifically designated as informal proceedings by the agency's
rules shall be conducted formally in accordance with the requirements of this
chapter.
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any adjudicative proceeding,
the presiding officer may convert a formal adjudicative proceeding to an informal adjudicative proceeding, or an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal adjudicative proceeding if:
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the rights
of any party.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-4, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, t 200.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,

§ 315 makes the act effective on January 1,
1988.

63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo
all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings.
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall
be as provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of
such a venue provision, in the county where the petitioner resides or
maintains his principal place of business.
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings
shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
shall include:
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial review;
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency;
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed,
together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of the
agency action;
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal
adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action;
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceeding;
(vi) facte demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is
entitled tc obtain judicial review;
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief
requested;
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to
relief,
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings.
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this
section.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25.
Amendment Notes* — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted "except
that final agency action from informal ao^judicative proceedings based on a record shall be
reviewed by the district courts on the record

according to the standards of Subsection
63-46b-16(4)n at the end in Subsection (l)(a)
and made minor stylistic changes,
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
§ 315 m a kes the act effective on January 1,
X988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Function of district court
sertion 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final
agency decisions through formal adjudicative
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore,

the district court will no longer function as intermediate appellate court except to review informal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

ADDENDUM D

DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South - P.O. Box 45805
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0805
Telephone: (801) 530-6628
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MOTION TO CONVERT TO
FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE
PROCEEDINGS

IN THE MATTER OF THE
CITATIONS ISSUED TO
MERIT Electrical &
Instrumentation, Inc.
Jonathan Carl Juretich
Christopher M. Schiffman
Dan A. Johnson
Kit Vaness Carson

CITATION NOS. 1986
1841
1917
1918
1842

COMES NOW the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
("Division") by and through William S. Essex, Jr., Supervisor,
Bureau of Investigations, Construction Trades Licensing Section,
and requests pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, (1990 Replacement)
("U.C.A."),

§

63-46b-4(3),

that

the adjudicative

proceeding

initiated by the issuance of Citation Nos. 1986, 1841, 1917, 1918,
and 1842 to MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc., Jonathan Carl
Juretich, Christopher M. Schiffman, Dan A. Johnson, and Kit Vaness
Carson be converted to a formal adjudicative proceeding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Citation No. 1986, 1841, 1917, 1918, and 1942 was issued to
MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc., Jonathan Carl Juretich,
Christopher M. Schiffman, Dan A. Johnson, and Kit Vaness Carson on

December 9, 1993. James W. Grant B. Antone Robinson, and Wayne J.
Holman, Division Investigator, issued the citation pursuant to the
authority granted in § 58-55-6((6). The citation was issued for an
alleged violation of § 58-55-2(32)(a), U.C.A.

Section 58-55-2(32)(a), U.C.A. provides that it is unlawful
for any person to Engaged in or represented himself to be engaged
in a construction trade or acted as or represented himself to be
acting as a contractor in a construction trade requiring licensure
while not licensed or excepted from licensure.
MERIT

Electrical

& Instrumentation,

Inc., Jonathan

Carl

Juretich, Christopher M. Schiffman, Dan A. Johnson, and Kit Vaness
Carson

("Respondents") submitted a Notice of Response to the

Division on December 27, 1994 in which he denied committing the
offense described in the citation and requested a hearing to
contest the citation.
"Respondents" base their denial of the charge on Section 5855-6(2) U.C.A., 1990 exempts from licensure"...any person engaged
in...construction and repair relating to...metal and coal mining.
Ruling

on this point of

law requires the expertise

of the

Administrative Law Judge and the Contractors Licensing Board.

STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY
Subsection 63-46b-4(l), U.C.A., permits agencies to designate
categories of adjudicative proceedings by rule.

Rule 156-46b-4,

Utah Administrative Rules (1992), designates any hearing held in
conjunction with a citation issued under Chapter 55, Title 58,
Construction

Trades Licensing Act

as an

informal

adjudicative

proceeding.
Subsection 63-46b-4(3), U.C.A. provides that any time before
a

final

order

is

issued

in

an

adjudicative

proceeding,

the

presiding officer may convert an informal adjudicative proceeding
to a formal adjudicative proceeding if:
(a) conversion
interest; and

of

the

proceeding

(b) conversion of the proceeding
prejudice the rights of any party.
Subsection

63-46b-5(l)(c)

provides

is
does
that

in

the

public

not

unfairly

in

informal

adjudicative proceedings, the parties are entitled to "testify,
present evidence, and comment on the issues."
Subsection 63-46b-8(l) (d) provides that in formal adjudicative
proceedings, the parties are entitled to "present evidence, argue,
respond, conduct cross-examine, and submit rebuttal evidence.
ARGUMENT
Respondents challenge the Division's issuance of the citations
relevant

to this processing

and

urge

58-55-6(2)

U.C.A.,

1990

applies to exempt them from licensure that statute provides and
exception for "...any person engaged in...construction and repair
relating to...metal and coal mining."

Any ruling on this legal

argument requires the expertise of both the Administrative Law
Judge, Contractors Licensing Board and Electricians Board.

It is further anticipated that both sides will call a number
of witnesses and require the need to follow the formal process of
direct and cross examination. A formal proceedings will also allow
the intervention and presentation of evidence by other interested
parties.
STATEMENT OP AUTHORITY
Subsection 63-46b04(l), U.C.A., permits agencies to designate
categories of adjudicative proceedings by rule.
Conversion

of the proceedings

to

a

Rule 156-46b-4.

formal

adjudicative

proceeding is therefore permitted by Section 63-46b-4(3) and is
appropriate given the circumstances present in this case.
Wherefore the Division requests that its motion be granted
unless the Respondent files an objection to the motion within 20
days from the date of this motion and the objection shows good
cause why the motion should not be granted.
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
DATE:

/*>/9%ie«*4€ij

/ //

/<?9?

BY: dM&^—*fU*f,/\f
William S. Essex, Jr.,
Supervisor
Bureau of Investigations
Construction Trades Licensing Section

MAILING CERTIFICATE

^

I hereby certify that on the
//
day of (Month) ,
1994, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO CONVERT TO
FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS was sent first class mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc.
Attn: Dave Roberts
Richard Cloy
17723 Airline Highway
Prairieville, Louisiana 70769
MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc.
Attn: Clint Cloy
12000 West 2100 South
P O Box 266
Magna, Utah 84044
Armin J. Moeller, Jr., Esquire
Phelps Dunbar
P 0 Box 23066
Jackson, Mississippi 39225-3066
Christopher M. Schiffman
c/o MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc.
12000 West 2100 South
P O Box 266
Magna, Utah 84044
Jonathan Carl Juretich
1081 East Saphire Drive
Sandy, Utah 84094
Dan A. Johnson
c/o MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc.
12000 West 2100 South
P O Box 266
Magna, Utah 84044
James C. Cloy
6500 South James Point Drive #3x
Murray, Utah 84107
Kit Vaness Carson
353 South 1st West
Tooele, Utah 84074
Darrell Bostwick
254 West 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Administrat

/

ADDENDUM E

DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South - P.O. Box 45805
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0805
Telephone : (801) 530-6628

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
CITATION ISSUED TO
Merit Electrical &
Instrumentation, Inc.,
Jonathan Carl Juretich,
Christopher M. Schiffman,
Dan A. Johnson, and
Kit Vaness Carson
(Respondent)

ORDER CONVERTING CITATION
TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE
PROCEEDINGS
,qv^
CITATION NOS.
£©+6
1841
1917
1918
1842

C^SC NO. OpL-cvvn

The Division in the above matter and prior to a hearing being
conducted has by motion requested this matter be converted to
formal adjudicative proceedings pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3) of
the Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended.
The basis given for the motion is that the content and scope
of the presentation anticipated in this case exceed the parameters
considered

when

citations

hearings

were

set

as

informal

adjudicative proceedings and therefore the public interest, rights
of the parties, issues and testimony involved in this case can be
better protected and addressed in a formal adjudicative proceeding
and that no party is prejudiced by the conversion.
It is noted from the files on these matters an attorney has
already made appearances in each of these matters and it appears

the parties expect the proceedings to go beyond the limitations
imposed by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(c)•

It also appears that no

party will be prejudiced by conversion to a formal proceedings as
no hearing or other proceedings has yet been held in this matter,
ORDER
Having found that conversion of this proceeding is in the
public interest and does not unfairly prejudice the rights of any
party and unless Respondents, within 20 days of the date of this
order, files a written objection to the motion to convert to formal
adjudicative
converted

proceedings,

from

informal

adjudicative proceedings.

it is ordered
adjudicative

that this matter is

proceedings

to

formal

This matter shall be rescheduled for

hearing before the Contractors Licensing Board.
The Respondents shall have 20 days from the date of this order
to file a written objection to this order.

If the Respondents so

object this order shall be vacated and a new order will thereafter
be issued determining whether or not conversion is appropriate in
this case.
Dated this

day of February 1994.

Dan S. Jones, Presiding Officer

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the // ^day of February, 1994, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER CONVERTING CITATIONS
ISSUED TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS was sent first class
mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc.
Attn: Dave Roberts
Richard Cloy
17723 Airline Highway
Prairieville, Louisiana 70769
MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc.
Attn: Clint Cloy
12000 West 2100 South
P 0 Box 266
Magna, Utah 84044
Armin J. Moeller, Jr., Esquire
Phelps Dunbar
P O Box 23066
Jackson, Mississippi 39225-3066
Christopher M. Schiffman
c/o MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc.
12000 West 2100 South
P 0 Box 266
Magna, Utah 84044
Jonathan Carl Juretich
1081 East Saphire Drive
Sandy, Utah 84094
Dan A. Johnson
c/o MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc.
12000 West 2100 South
P O Box 266
Magna, Utah 84044
James C. Cloy
6500 South James Point Drive #3x
Murray, Utah 84107
Kit Vaness Carson
353 South 1st West
Tooele, Utah 84074

Darrell Bostwick
254 West 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

z.

2>XGarol W.—Inglesby
Administrative Assistant

"Carol Inglesby, Administrative Assistant

ADDENDUM F

DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South - P.O. Box 45805
Salt Lake City# Utah 84145-0805
Telephone : (801) 530-6628

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL £ PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
CITATION ISSUED TO
Merit Electrical &
Instrumentation, Inc.,
Jonathan Carl Juretich,
Christopher M. Schiffman,
Dan A. Johnson, and
Kit Vaness Carson
(Respondent)

ORDER VACATING CONVERSION OF
CITATIONS TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE
PROCEEDINGS AND NOTICE OF HEARING
CITATION NOS.
1846
1841
1917
1918
1842

The Division in the above matter and prior to a hearing being
conducted by motion requested this matter be converted to formal
adjudicative proceedings pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3) of the
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended.
Pursuant to the Division's motion an order was signed granting
the motion to convert proceeding on February 11, 1994. That order
provided that if the Respondents filed a written objection to the
motion to convert to formal adjudicative proceedings, the order
would be vacated

and a new order will thereafter be issued

determining whether or not conversion is appropriate in this case.
On the 3rd day of March 1994, the Respondents filed an
objection to the motion to convert.
The Respondent's

have

also

requested

a hearing

on the

Division's

Motion

to

Convert

and

the Respondent's

Objection

thereto.
ORDER
Having

found that the Respondents have

filed

a written

objection to the motion to convert these proceedings to formal
adjudicative proceedings as allowed by the prior order, it is
ordered that the order of conversion of proceedings dated February
11, 1994 is hereby vacated.
This matter is hereby rescheduled for hearing on the Division
Motion to Convert Proceedings and Respondents Objection thereto to
be conducted on March 28, 1994 at 2:00 p.m. in Room 451 of the
Heber Wells Building 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Dated this

^/^

day of March 1994.

Dan S. Jones, Presiding Officer

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the V ^ day of March, 1994, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER VACATING CONVERSION OF
CITATIONS TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS AND NOTICE OF HEARING
was sent first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
MERIT Electrical & Instrumentation, Inc.
Attn: Dave Roberts
Richard Cloy
17723 Airline Highway
Prairieville, Louisiana 70769
MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc.
Attn: Clint Cloy
12000 West 2100 South
P 0 Box 266
Magna, Utah 84044
Armin J. Moeller, Jr., Esquire
Phelps Dunbar
P O Box 23066
Jackson, Mississippi 39225-3066
Christopher M. Schiffman
c/o MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc.
12000 West 2100 South
P O Box 266
Magna, Utah 84044
Jonathan Carl Juretich
1081 East Saphire Drive
Sandy, Utah 84094
Dan A. Johnson
c/o MERIT Electrical & Instrumental, Inc.
12000 West 2100 South
P O Box 266
Magna, Utah 84 044
James C. Cloy
6500 South James Point Drive #3x
Murray, Utah 84107
Kit Vaness Carson
353 South 1st West
Tooele, Utah 84074

Darrell Bostwick
254 West 4 00 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Caroi~W. Ingle^by ~7
Administrative Assistant

Carol Inglesby, Administrative Assistant

ADDENDUM G

DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South - P.O. Box 45805
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0805
Telephone : (801) 530-6628

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL £ PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF TEE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
CITATION ISSUED TO
Merit Electrical &
Instrumentation, Inc.,
Jonathan Carl Juretich,
Christopher M. Schiffman,
Dan A. Johnson, and
Kit Vaness Carson
(Respondent)

ORDER CONVERTING CITATION
TO FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE
PROCEEDINGS
CITATION NOS.
1846
1841
1917
1918
1842

The above matters came on for hearing on the Division's motion
to convert the above citation to formal adjudicative proceedings on
March 28, 1994. The Presiding Officer being fully advised in the
premises now enters the following Conclusions of Law and Order.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Jurisdiction.
The Respondents in their objection to Motion and Order have
alleged that upon entry of the order converting these matters to
formal adjudicative proceedings entered on February 11, 1994, the
presiding officer divested himself of any further jurisdiction in
the matter until the ALJ remanded the matter as an informal
hearing.
1

This argument is without merit.
clearly

retained

jurisdiction

The February 11, 1994 order

if the order was objected to.

Specifically, the applicable portion of the order reads as follows:
The Respondents shall have 20 days from the date of this
order to file a written objection to this order.
If the
Respondents so object this order shall be vacated and a new
order will thereafter be issued determining whether or not
conversion is appropriate in this case.
Must Citation be heard as informal hearings.
The Respondents claim that Utah Administrative Code Section
R156-46b-4(2) (d) requires that citation hearings shall be conducted
on an informal basis, and therefore the Division is violating its
own

rules

in

its

motion

to

convert

the

matter

to

formal

adjudicative proceedings.
This argument is without merit.

The Division in designating

citation hearings as informal adjudicative proceedings, did not
eliminate the possibility that appropriate cases could be converted
to formal adjudicative proceedings.
that

the

Division's

Bureau

of

To the contrary it is noted

Investigations,

Policies

and

Procedures manual dated December 1, 1993 anticipated that such
conversions to formal proceedings would occur in appropriate cases
and included model forms drafted for the purposes of conversion of
such cases to formal proceedings.

It therefore appears this

possibility of converting matters to formal proceedings was a
factor in designating citations as informal procedures.
Furthermore the Utah Administrative Procedures Act at Utah
Code Annotated S 63-46b-4(3) clearly provides, "any11 informal
proceeding may be converted to formal proceedings.
2

Criteria for Conversion.
Having found that there is no prohibition against converting
to formal proceedings and having found no specific Division rules
on

the

criteria

for

conversion

of

such

matters

to

formal

adjudicative proceedings, the applicable requirements to support an
order

of

conversion

to

formal

procedures

is

found

at Utah

Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-4(3)
which requires that the conversion of the proceedings is in the
public interest and conversion of the proceedings does not unfairly
prejudice any party.
Public Interest.
The Division has cited the public interest in conversion of
this case in that the proceeding to be conducted are highly
disputed in what may be a novel interpretation of the facts and law
which may require the cross examination of witnesses and require
submittal of rebuttal evidence in order fully address the issues in
the

case, and may require the expertise

of the contractors

licensing board.
I find the public interest has been sufficiently shown in
these cases.
Subsection

63-46b-5(l)(c)

provides

that

in

informal

adjudicative proceedings, the parties are entitled to "testify,
present evidence, and comment on the issues".
This is compared to subsection 63-46b-8(l)(d) which provides
that in formal adjudicative proceedings, the parties are entitled
to "present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination and

3

submit rebuttal evidenceM.
In most citation hearings, the limited scope of the hearing is
sufficient to adequately address all issues that need to be
presented to fully advise the presiding officer of the premises in
the case.
The wider scope of the formal proceeding is designed to assure
the parties are given full and fair opportunity to present and
argue their respective cases. This full opportunity to present the
respective case in a formal proceeding appears to be the very
reason that a trial de novo is allowed in an appeal to district
court if the parties have only been accorded an informal hearing
and not allowed if the parties have had a formal hearing. (To be
addressed more later)•
The Respondents have argued that the sole issue in this case
is a matter of law and therefore there are no factual issues and
therefore cross examination is not needed and therefore an informal
hearing can resolve the matter.
This argument is without merit.
The parties are disputing whether the work that was the basis
for the citation is included in the exemption allowed under Utah
Code Annotated section 58-55-6-(2) for construction and operation
incidental to metal or coal mining.

The parties dispute whether

the construction of a refinery operation is sufficiently related to
"mining" to allow the exemption in these cases.
Black's law dictionary defines mining as, "The process or
business of extracting from the earth the precious or valuable

4

metals, either in their native state or in their ores."
It would appear from the plain language of the exemption may
not include refining ore which would not be done at the mine site
itself where the "extracting from the earth" occurs. The extent of
how far the language "incidental to" goes is a mixed question of
law and fact.
It is inconceivable, as a presiding officer, that I can decide
this issue without receiving factual testimony of what is the
relationship of the mine site to the refinery site. It is equally
apparent to me that

in order to have this issue adequately

addressed that any such testimony of how closely related these
activities are should be subject to cross examination by the other
parties in order to fully evaluate this case.
Therefore I find that conversion to formal proceedings is
necessary to the proper resolution of the matter.

It would be a

needless waste of the resources of both parties to force the
parties to conduct an informal hearing when a formal hearing is
necessary to fully resolve the issues. It appears that forcing the
parties to participate in an informal hearing in such a case, no
matter which party prevailed, would only force an appeal so that
the parties could fully present their case in a formal setting. It
is in the public interest for appropriate cases to be resolved with
full presentation of the case to avoid unnecessary waste of
resources and to have the matter adequately addressed at the first
hearing of the matter.

5

No unfair prejudice to any party.
The Respondents have alleged that they will be denied their
right to trial de novo at district court if the matter is converted
to an formal proceedings and is therefore prejudicial and therefore
conversion is not allowed.
This argument is without merit.
The import of the trial de novo is that a party at some stage
must be given the full opportunity to present its case with all the
appropriate protections and rights accorded a formal hearing.
The fact that conversion to formal proceedings may change the
rights on appeal at district court is not dispositive. If it were,
any conversion to formal proceedings would be impossible.

Since

conversion is clearly allowed, this right to trial de novo cannot
be the deciding factor of whether or not to order the conversion.
The only prejudicial effect that I can find presented by these
matters, of whether an a order should be issued converting the
matters to formal proceedings, is that the parties right to fully
present the case in these matters may prejudiced in an informal
setting because of the limitation of the informal hearing and
therefore find that these matters must be converted in to formal
proceedings in order to adequately address the issue at hand.
It is difficult to find a situation where being accorded the
full scope of a hearing to the parties in a formal proceeding could
be prejudicial to the presentation of their case.
It is noted that the motion for conversion was made prior to
any hearing on these citations.

6

The Respondents have not been

prejudiced by preparing for hearing in one setting and then being
required to hear the matter in another setting.
The Respondent have claimed that defending the actions in a
formal hearing will cost them more in defense costs and time and
therefore is prejudicial to them and therefore should not be
converted. Again if this were the deciding criteria no cases could
be converted to formal proceedings, in that the formal proceedings
by nature of the allowed presentation will take more time.
Therefore, this factor alone is not "unfairly" prejudicial to the
party.
Finally, the Respondents have claimed that there may be
improper motives behind these citations or other improper actions
may happen in a formal proceeding preceding that should not be
allowed to happen.
I can find no merit to this argument. Quite to the contrary,
if improprieties are at issue in this case it would only further
heighten the need that these matters be held in a setting which can
adequately address and rule upon such allegations.

I can find no

basis whatsoever to conclude that any motions or proceedings that
would be conducted on a formal basis would not be handled according
to applicable law.

7

ORDER
Having found that conversion of this proceeding is in the
public interest and does not unfairly prejudice the rights of any
party, it is ordered that this matter is converted from informal
adjudicative proceedings to formal adjudicative proceedings. This
matter shall be rescheduled for hearing before the Contractors
Licensing Board.
Dated this

S

<U>—

day of April 1994.

Dan S. Jones, Presiding Officer
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ADDENDUM H

BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ORDER ON REVIEW

IN THE MATTER OF:
MERIT ELECTRICAL AND
INSTRUMENTATION INC.
JONATHAN CARL JURETICH
CHRISTOPHER M. SCHIFFMAN
DAN A. JOHNSON AND
KIT VANESS CARSON

CITATION NOS.
OPL-94-28, OPL-94-29,
OPL-94-30, OPL-94-31
and OPL-94-32

INTRODUCTION
This case began with issuance of the above-enumerated citations by the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing (MDOPLM) of the Department of Commerce.
Respondents requested a hearing to contest the citations. Pursuant to Department Rule 156-46b202(m), hearings in citation cases are designated as informal under the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act. However, on motion of DOPL, the hearing officer converted the proceedings
to formal (the "Conversion Order"), and it is that conversion that Respondents contest.
Respondents filed a request for review with the Executive Director of the Department, requesting
that the Conversion Order be reversed and that the Division enter an order setting an informal
hearing.

STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW
The review of this matter is being conducted by the Executive Director of the Department
of Commerce pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-12, and Rule 151-46b-13 of the Rules
of Procedure for Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce.

THE ISSUES REVIEWED
1.

Respondents raise the following issues:

a.

The Division has no authority to convert proceedings from informal to formal;

b.

Even if it does, conversion here is improper under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-4(3)
because conversion is not in the public interest and will cause unfair prejudice to
Respondents; and

c.

The Conversion Order is an impermissible attempt at rulemaking.

2.

Initially, however, the issue to be addressed is whether the Conversion Order is

reviewable by the Executive Director.

FINDINGS OF FACT
No evidence has yet been presented to establish any of the factual allegations relevant to
the citation in this proceeding. However, the procedural history of this case can be summarized
as follows:
1.

On or about December 9, 1993, DOPL issued citations to Merit Electrical &

Instrumentation, Inc. ("Merit") and four of its employees alleging violations of the Utah
Construction Trades Licensing Act (Utah Code Ann. Title 58, Chapter 55). The citations are

-2-

based on allegations that Merit unlawfully employed electricians who were unlicensed and not
exempt from licensure under the Act.
2.

The citations were consolidated into one proceeding. Pursuant to a request by

DOPL, and following briefing by the parties, the hearing officer issued the Conversion Order
dated April 5, 1994. Respondents filed a Request for Reconsideration. They also filed a Request
for Review with the executive director. Both parties have thoroughly briefed the issue in various
memoranda in support.

The hearing, previously scheduled to be conducted before the

Contractors' Licensing Board, has been continued without date pending completion of this
review.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Section 63-46b-14(l) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann.

Title 63, Chapter 46b ("UAPA") allows a party to seek judicial review of "final agency action".
The finality requirement applies to agency action taken in either informal or formal proceedings.
2.

UAPA is silent, however as to whether interim orders entered in proceedings

before a division are subject to agency review by the head of the department Clearly, an order
is not "final" — for purposes of judicial review - if it reserves something to the agency for
further decision. See Sloan v. Board of Review, 781 P. 2d 463 (Utah Ct App. 1989).
3.

The Utah Court of Appeals issued an unpublished opinion in Eliason v. Buhler,

etal (Case No. 900518, December 5,1990) (copy attached). In that case, the executive director
of the Department of Commerce had issued an order on review prior to the conclusion of an
administrative proceeding. However, the court stated that

-3-

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12 (1989) permits further administrative review of an
administrative law judge's order only "[i]f a statute or the agency's rules permit
parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek [such] review."
The Court ordered the executive director of the Department of Commerce to vacate an
order on review because he had no authority to review an interim order.
The statute on which the Court relied in the Eliason case, §13-1-12, has since been
repealed. That statute had permitted an appeal to the executive director "at the close of an
adjudicative proceeding". Section 13-1-8.5 generally applies to all departmental adjudicative
proceedings and thus requires the department to follow the UAPA. Section 63-46b-12 of the
UAPA provides that a party may file a request for review if permitted to do so by any statute or
rule. No statute exists which authorizes agency review of interim orders. Further, departmental
rules which govern agency review are silent as to whether any such review is permitted.
5.

Section 58-1-109, addressing administrative proceedings before DOPL, expressly

provides:
The final order of the director [or his designee] may be appealed by filing
a request for agency review with the executive director or his designee within the
department.
(§58-M09(8))(Eraphasis added)

Section §58-1-109 limits agency review to final orders. The Conversion Order is not a
final order. Thus, no proper legal basis exists to conduct agency review of that order during the
pendency of proceedings before the Division.
7.

Because of this ruling, I am not considering the issues raised by Respondents.

.4.

ORDER
Respondents' request for review of the Conversion Order is denied and this case is
remanded to the Division for further proceedings.
Dated thisc^ 7 day of June, 1994

CfytQku^Constance B. White, Executive Director
Department of Commerce

NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review of this Order, if it is available, may be sought by filing a Petition for
Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of this Order. Any Petition for such Review
shall comply with the requirements stt forth in Section 63-46b-14 and Section 63-46b-16.
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